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Regulation of Digital Trade in US Free Trade Agreements: 
From Trade Regulation to Digital Regulation 
Henry Gao 
 
Abstract: 
This article reviews the evolution of rules on digital trade in US FTAs, and argues that 
the US approach has shifted from treating it largely as a traditional trade issue to recognizing its 
unique digital nature and tailoring the rules accordingly, as it has done in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement. The article starts with a review of the efforts to regulate 
e-commerce in the WTO, as well as what the pre-TPP US FTAs have achieved so far, followed 
by a critical appraisal of the achievements and shortcomings of the e-commerce chapter in the 
TPP. It is hoped that, by reviewing the evolution of the regulation of e-commerce from the WTO 
to the TPP, we can learn some lessons on how the rules are being shaped, as well as how it 
might evolve in the future. 
 
As one of the largest traders in the world, the United States (“US”) has long regarded 
itself as a champion of free trade and the leader in the global trading system. As the architect of 
the Bretton Woods System, the US has, until very recently, preferred to engage in rule-making 
efforts in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and its successor, the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”). However, when the last negotiating round of the WTO, the Doha 
Round, collapsed in 2008, the US started to turn to various bilateral and regional Free Trade 
Agreements to advance its trade agenda. As noted by the US Government in its latest Trade 
Policy Review, the US “has insisted on high standards for U.S. trade agreements”,1 and used 
such agreements to not only “remove barriers to trade”, but also “address new and emerging 
trade issues”.2 
                                                          
 Associate Professor, Singapore Management University; Dongfang Scholar Chair Professor, Shanghai Institute of 
Foreign Trade. Email: gaohenry@gmail.com. 
1 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review report by the United States, WT/TPR/G/350, 14 November 
20164.12, at para. 4.12.  
2 Id., at para. 4.11. 
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One of such new and emerging issues is digital trade, which has “a profound and positive 
impact on the U.S. economy” according to the United States Trade Representative (USTR).3 
This article reviews the evolution of rules on digital trade in US FTAs, and argues that the US 
approach has shifted from treating it largely as a traditional trade issue to recognizing its unique 
digital nature and tailoring the rules accordingly, as it has done in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“TPP”) Agreement. The article starts with a review of the efforts to regulate e-commerce in the 
WTO, as well as what the pre-TPP US FTAs have achieved so far, followed by a critical 
appraisal of the achievements and shortcomings of the e-commerce chapter in the TPP. It is 
hoped that, by reviewing the evolution of the regulation of e-commerce from the WTO to the 
TPP, we can learn some lessons on how the rules are being shaped, as well as how it might 
evolve in the future.  
 
I. Regulation of E-commerce in the WTO 
 
1. Overview of the Regulation of E-commerce in the WTO 
 
In the WTO, the first effort to regulate e-commerce was made at the 2nd Ministerial 
Conference in May 1998, where the Members adopted the Declaration on Global Electronic 
Commerce.4 The Declaration recognized the “new opportunities for trade”, and directed the 
General Council to “establish a comprehensive work programme to examine all trade-related 
issues relating to global electronic commerce, including those issues identified by Members.”5 
 
In the Declaration, the Members also agreed to “continue their current practice of not 
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions”.6 This moratorium on customs cuties has 
                                                          
3 USTR, Ambassador Froman Announces New Digital Trade Working Group, July 18, 2016, available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/july/ambassador-froman-announces-ne
w.  
4 WTO, Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, adopted on 20 May 1998 at the Second WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, 25 May 1998.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
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been extended several times, latest in Nairobi until 2017.7  
 
At the same time, the moratorium also left a few questions unanswered. First of all, it is 
unclear as to whether the term “electronic transmissions” refers only to the medium of 
e-commerce, or to the content of the transmission as well, i.e., the underlying product or service 
being transmitted.8 Second, if it refers to the medium of transmission only, does this mean that 
other digital products which are supplied via traditional medium, such as books, music or videos 
on CDs could be subject to customs duties? Third, does the prohibition applies only to customs 
duties, or to other fees or charges imposed on the digital products? Fourth, does the moratorium 
applies only to imports, or to exports as well? 
 
Pursuant to the Declaration, the General Council adopted the Work Programme on 
Electronic Commerce in September 1998.9 Under the Work Program, "electronic commerce" is 
broadly defined to cover “the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and 
services by electronic means”.10 Moreover, the Work Program also includes under its scope 
“issues relating to the development of the infrastructure for electronic commerce.”  
 
As e-commerce cuts across many different areas, the Work Program divides up the work 
among different WTO bodies as follows:  
The Council for Trade in Services shall examine the treatment of electronic commerce in 
the GATS legal framework, which include horizontal issues such as the scope and classification 
of sectors and access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services, 
the application of both unconditional obligations such as MFN and transparency and conditional 
obligations like market access, national treatment and domestic regulation, standards, and 
                                                          
7 WTO, Ministerial Decision on Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, adopted on 19 December 2015 at the 
Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, WT/MIN(15)/42 — WT/L/977, 21 December 2015.  
8 See e.g., Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The WTO, the Internet and Trade in Digital Products: EC-US Perspectives, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006; Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, Towards Coherent Rules for Digital Trade: 
Building on Efforts in Multilateral versus Preferential Trade Negotiations, in Mira Burri and Thomas Cottier (eds.), 
Trade Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2012, at p. 182. 
9 WTO, Work programme on Electronic Commerce, adopted by the General Council on 25 September 1998, 
WT/L/274, 30 September 1998.  
10 Id., para. 1.3.  
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recognition, as well as measures taken for the protection of privacy and public morals, the 
prevention of fraud and competition disciplines;11  
The Council for Trade in Goods shall examine aspects of electronic commerce relevant to 
the provisions of GATT 1994, the multilateral trade agreements covered under Annex 1A of the 
WTO Agreement, and the approved work programme, which include not only tariff-related 
issues such as classification, customs duties and market access, but also non-tariff issues such as 
rules of origin, customs valuation, import licensing and standards;12 
The Council for TRIPS shall examine the intellectual property issues arising in 
connection with electronic commerce, which include issues such as the protection and 
enforcement of copyright and trademarks, and new technologies and access to technology;13 
The Committee on Trade and Development shall examine and report on the development 
implications of electronic commerce, taking into account the economic, financial and 
development needs of developing countries.14 
 
These bodies shall report their progress to the General Council on a regular basis.15 In 
addition, the General Council is also responsible for the review of any cross-cutting trade-related  
and all aspects of the work programme concerning the imposition of customs duties on electronic 
transmission.16 In carrying out its work, these bodies shall also take into account the work of 
other intergovernmental organizations as well as relevant non-governmental organizations.17 
 
Since then, the Members have conducted many discussions on e-commerce in the various 
bodies. However, due to the slow progress in the DDA in general, the Members have not been 
able to reach any decision on the substantive disciplines on e-commerce notwithstanding the 
                                                          
11 Id., para. 2.1.  
12 Id., para. 3.1.  
13 Id., para. 4.1. 
14 Id., para. 5.1. 
15 Id., para. 1.2. 
16 Id.  
17 Id., para. 1.4. 
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ambitious agenda foreseen in the Work Program.18 
 
In the absence of new disciplines, the main obligations on the regulation of e-commerce 
under the existing WTO legal framework can be found in the GATS Telecom Annex, which sets 
out the basic rights of access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and 
services by service suppliers, including e-commerce suppliers.19 Under para. 5.a., the general 
principle is that such service suppliers shall be accorded access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions. This principle is further elaborated in the following sub-paras, which try to strike 
a delicate balance between the users’ rights (para. 5 lit. b and c) and the regulators’ rights (para. 5 
lit. E–g).20  
 
Beyond the rules in the Telecom Annex, the issues involved in the regulation of 
e-commerce in the WTO fall into the following three main areas.  
 
The first is the classification issue. As we stated earlier, Internet activities can be 
classified as goods or services.21 The distinction is not merely theoretical but has profound 
practical implications. If they are treated as goods, they could be subject first and foremost to 
customs duties, as well as MFN, national treatment, and a whole set of non-tariff disciplines such 
as those on rules of origin, import licensing, customs valuation etc. On the other hand, if they are 
treated as services, the Members will not be able to regulate them through border measures such 
as tariffs, but they would have significant leeway in imposing domestic regulations on 
e-commerce.  
                                                          
18 WTO: Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce Under the 
Auspices Of The General Council, Report to the 21 November 2013 meeting of the General Council, 
WT/GC/W/676, 11 November 2013.  
19 WTO, Annex on Telecommunications, in General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 
1167 (1994).  
20 For a detailed discussion on this principle, see Henry Gao, Commentary on Telecommunication Services, in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Peter-Tobias Stoll (eds), MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, 
VOLUME VI: “WTO – TRADE IN SERVICES”, Brill Publishers, 2008, paras. 41-54. 
21 See Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, supra note 8, 2012, at p. 183.  
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 While some activities such as the online delivery of books and audio-visual products 
could arguably be classified as goods according to the technology-neutrality principle, most 
activities carried through the Internet share more similarities with services trade. For example, 
many e-commerce activities are intangible and non-storable like services. Similarly, many 
e-commerce activities are produced with the joint input from both the suppliers and consumers, 
thus are tailor-made according to the needs of specific consumers like other services.  
 
As it is impossible to provide a comprehensive discussion of both goods and services in 
such a short paper, we shall mainly focus on the services issues here. Unlike the GATT, which 
applies a uniform set of rules to most products, the GATS adopts a different regulatory approach. 
According to the “positive listing” approach, WTO Members only assume obligations for sectors 
that they have included in their schedule of specific commitments.22 Thus, we have to further 
determine which sector or sub-sector e-commerce activities fall under and check the respective 
schedules to see if it is covered.  
 
Second, even for services covered in its schedule, a WTO Member can choose among 
different levels of liberalization by inscribing commitments ranging from “none” (which means 
“no limitation” or “fully liberalized”) to “unbound” (which means “no commitment”) in the 
market access and national treatment columns.23 Thus, we have to determine the appropriate 
obligations for e-commerce activities.  
 
Third, for legitimate policy reasons, WTO Members might need to deviate from their 
normal obligations. This is possible under both the GATT and GATS by citing the “General 
Exceptions” clauses.24 However, as illustrated by the WTO cases, the preferred exceptions under 
each agreement have been rather different. Under the GATT, the most commonly cited exceptions 
                                                          
22 See GATS Article XVI: Market Access.  
23 See WTO, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the GATS, Adopted by the Council for 
Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, S/L/92, 28 March 2001, paras. 41-49.  
24 See GATT 1994 Article XX & GATS Article XIV.  
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are the ones to protect public health and environment.25 In contrast, the favourite clause under the 
GATS has been the public morals exception.26  
 
Due to its unique nature, e-commerce activities pose special challenges to the GATS 
regulatory framework on all three issues. In the following sections, I will discuss the regulatory 
difficulties in each of these areas and, where appropriate, make some policy suggestions on how 
to address these problems. 
 
2. Classifications 
 
Under the GATS, services are classified according to the Services Sectoral Classification 
List, which classifies all services into 12 sectors and 160 sub-sectors.27 While this system does a 
good job in classifying most other services sectors, it has not been so useful in classifying 
e-commerce activities. To start with, the Classification List is outdated as it is based on the 
United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification (CPCprov).28 The CPCprov was 
published in 1990, when the Internet was still in its infancy and many e-commerce activities, 
such as search engines, did not even exist. It doesn’t provide direct reference to many 
e-commerce activities that are common today. Instead, they are often scattered across many 
sectors. For example, search engine services can arguably be classified under either 
telecommunication services or computer and related services. Paradoxically, some of the 
classifications under the Services Sectoral Classification List also overlap with each other. For 
example, under the List, online info processing and data processing share the same code under 
CPCprov, but are grouped under telecommunication services and computer services respectively.  
 
To better capture the reality of e-commerce activities, the current classification system 
                                                          
25 GATT 1994 Article XX(b) & (g).  
26 GATS Article XIV(a). 
27 WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.  
28 United Nations, Provisional Central Product Classification, 1991, available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/CR/Registry/regcst.asp?Cl=9&Lg=1.  
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needs to be reviewed and revamped in a systematic manner.29 Depending on the nature of the 
services, different approaches should be taken. On the one hand, for e-commerce activities which 
have been supplied through traditional channels before the advent of the Internet, they should be 
grouped under the original sector as per the technology-neutrality principle, unless of course 
their natures have been changed by the online delivery.30 Thus, online banking services shall be 
classified under banking services, and online universities shall be classified under educational 
services, etc. On the other hand, the classification of services that only emerged with the birth of 
Internet is trickier. As the latest version of the CPC includes many such services, it is tempting to 
simply replace the reference to the CPCprov codes in the Services Sectoral Classification List 
with the corresponding codes in the new version. However, this approach is undesirable for the 
following reasons. First, as the Services Sectoral Classification List is not mandatory, not every 
WTO Member uses it or includes explicit reference to the CPC codes in its schedule;31 Second, 
even for those that do use the CPC, the schedule cannot be simply updated with the new CPC 
versions. This is because the CPC often re-shuffles the code numbers around when the versions 
are updated, thus the same code numbers under different versions might refer to entirely different 
services.32 Third, as cases like U.S.-Gambling have shown, it has been a challenge for WTO 
Members to fully understand even their own commitments.33 Thus, they will not accept a 
                                                          
29 For an overview of the classification issues for e-commerce, see Lee Tuthill & Martin Roy, GATS Classification 
Issues for Information and Communication Technology Services, in in Mira Burri and Thomas Cottier (eds.), Trade 
Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2012, at pp. 157-178.  
30 For a discussion of the application of the technology-neutrality principle to e-commerce activities, see Peng, 
Shin-yi. ‘GATS and the Over-the-Top Services: A Legal Outlook’. Journal of World Trade 50, no. 1 (2016): 21–46. 
31 Notably, the United States doesn’t use the CPC code in its classification. See the United States of America, 
Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/90, 15 April 1994. However, while the US schedule makes no 
explicit references to CPC numbers, it corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list. See United States 
International Trade Commission, U.S. Schedule of Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(with explanatory materials prepared by the U.S. International Trade Commission, includes supplemental 
commitments and MFN exemptions on basic telecommunication services, finalized on February 15,1997, and on 
financial services, finalized on December 13,1997), Investigation No. 332-354, August 1998. This issue was also 
debated in the US-Gambling case, see Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797, at paras. 3.41-3.43, 3.65.  
32 A good example is the classification of Data processing services (CPC 843) under CPC Prov and CPC Ver.1, 
which is discussed in detail in Henry Gao, Googling for the Trade-Human Rights Nexus in China: Can the WTO 
Help?, in Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier (eds.), TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, pp. 258-260.   
33 Panel Report, US- Gambling, supra note 31, at paras. 3.44-3.70, 6.135-136. .  
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comprehensive update of the schedules without careful scrutiny.  
 
Because of these difficulties, even just an update of the schedules based on the latest CPC 
version probably cannot be achieved without major negotiation efforts. In addition, as many 
e-commerce activities are closely linked together, it is probably better to take a cluster approach 
in the review and deal with them together.34  
 
3. Obligations   
 
Other than the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, most obligations under the GATS 
only applies when a Member schedules relevant commitments. For each sector that a Member 
includes in its schedule, the Member may choose how much market access35 or national 
treatment36 that it is willing to offer. Moreover, such scheduled commitments are also subject to 
sector or mode-specific limitations.  
 
For e-commerce activities, such regulatory framework creates the following problems:  
 
First is ambiguity in sectoral coverage. Even though a Member may choose which sectors 
to include in its schedule, ambiguities could still arise due to imperfections in the classification 
system. A good example in this regard is the U.S.-Gambling case. In this case, the United States 
included in its schedule a sub-sector entitled “Other Recreational Services (except sporting)”. 
While the United States argued that “sporting” includes gambling services, the WTO Panel 
                                                          
34 The cluster approach was proposed by the US and the EU in 2000. See WTO Council for Trade in Services: 
Special Session, Communication from the European Communities and their Member States: The Cluster Approach, 
S/CSS/W/3, 22 May 2000; Communication from the United States: Framework for Negotiation, S/CSS/W/4, 13 July 
2000. This approach grew out of an initial proposal by Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras for an annex 
on tourism in the GATS, see Chakravarthi Raghavan, To Cluster or Not to Cluster (in GATS), South-North 
Development Monitor, Geneva, 19 July 2000, available at http://www.twn.my/title/cluster.htm.  
35 See GATS Article XVI.1, “With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, 
each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.” 
36 See GATS Article XVII.1, “In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in 
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
like services and service suppliers.” 
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disagreed and ruled that sporting doesn’t include gambling services and thus should be included in 
the U.S. commitments.37 While this problem could arise in any services sector, e-commerce 
activities are particularly prone to interpretive ambiguities due to the classification difficulties 
mentioned earlier.  
 
The second problem is confusion on modes of supply. Under the GATS, services could 
be supplied in four modes: 1, cross-border supply, 2, consumption abroad, 3, commercial 
presence, and 4, movement of natural persons.38 For e-commerce activities, it is quite difficult to 
tell if a service is supplied through Mode 1 or 2 as the service is provided in the cyberspace.39 
Further complication could arise in cases where the service supplier is located in another WTO 
Member, but maintains server in the home country of the consumer. It could be argued that 
Mode 3 shall apply in such cases. As a Member may have different levels of commitments 
depending on the mode of supply, the confusion over mode of supply could lead to illogical 
consequences.  
 
To address these problems, the author makes two suggestions. First, the WTO Members 
should agree on a set of scheduling guidelines for e-commerce activities. This would help clarify 
the meaning of schedules and avoid future complications. Second is the formulation of a set of 
regulatory principles that sets a minimum regulatory standard for the e-commerce activities. In 
this regard, the Telecommunications Reference Paper40 provides a really good model due to the 
close links between the two sectors.41  
                                                          
37 See Panel Report, US- Gambling, supra note 31, at paras. 3.30-3.70; 6.34-6.138.  
38 GATS Article 1.2, “For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: (a) 
from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; (b) in the territory of one Member to the 
service consumer of any other Member; (c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in 
the territory of any other Member; (d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a 
Member in the territory of any other Member.” 
39 See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Note by the 
Secretariat, S/C/W/68, 16 November 1998, paras. 7-8. See also, Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, supra note 8, 
2012, at p.182.  
40 WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper, 24 
April 1996.  
41 For an example on how the Reference Paper can be revised to apply to internet networks, see Rohan 
Kariyawasam, Better Regulation of Digital Markets: A New Look at the Reference Paper, in Mira Burri and Thomas 
 11 
 
4. Exceptions  
 
The General Exceptions clause allows a WTO Member to deviate from its normal 
obligations.42 Under the GATS, the most frequently cited exception is the public morals 
exception. Interestingly, in both of the two cases concerning Internet services, i.e., the 
U.S.-Gambling case43 and the China-Publications case44, the respondent cited the public morals 
exception to defend their measures. In their rulings, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body often 
accord wide discretions to the national authorities in defining both the boundaries and depth of 
the exception, but this could lead to bizarre results. For example, in the China-Publications case, 
the Appellate Body encouraged the Chinese government to conduct censorship itself as it is 
supposedly better than outsourcing to private firms from the perspective of WTO law.45 
 
In my view, it is problematic to accord wide discretions on the public morals exception to 
countries without democratically-elected governments as such the governments’ views on public 
morals are not necessarily truly aligned with those of the people. A good way to prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cottier (eds.), Trade Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2012, at pp. 
222-246.  
42 See GATS Article XIV.  
43 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475); 
Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 
5797.  
44 See Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 
3; Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p. 261.  
45 In this case, the US proposed that, instead of having the importing firms conduct the content review of imported 
publications, the Chinese Government shall be given sole responsibility for conducting content review. Both the 
Panel and the Appellate Body agreed that these are reasonably available alternatives. See, Appellate Body Report, 
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 44, at paras. 7.869-7.909. For a discussion of the Panel 
and Appellate Body decisions in the China — Publications and Audiovisual Products case, see Panagiotis 
Delimatsis, The Puzzling Interaction of Trade and Public Morales in the Digital Era, in Mira Burri and Thomas 
Cottier (eds.), Trade Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2012, at pp. 
285-289.  
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potential abuse of the exception is to adopt some universal benchmark on what may qualify as 
public morals, so that fundamental human rights, such as those enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,46 will not be harmed under the disguise to protect public morals. As 
the core competence of the WTO is in trade, it is ill-equipped with this task. Instead, we should 
consider adopting a mechanism similar to the one under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement,47 i.e., having the standards formulated by another international organization48 with 
competence on public morals issue, and making it mandatory for the WTO to consult them when 
disputes arise.49  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, while the GATS, in its current form, is not well suited to the regulation of 
e-commerce, it has the potential to keep up with the regulatory task. However, to make this 
happen, we will need new approaches in dealing with e-commerce activities, especially on key 
issues such as classifications, obligations and exceptions.  
 
In this regard, the WTO might wish to learn from the approaches taken in the various 
FTA, especially the ones negotiated by the US, the world leader in e-commerce. In the next part, 
we will examine how the US FTAs treat the e-commerce issue.  
 
II. Regulation of E-commerce in US FTAs 
 
Since its FTA with Jordan in 2000, the US has included e-commerce chapters in every 
                                                          
46 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).  
47 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
48 See SPS Agreement, Annex A, Para. 3, which refers explicitly to the SPS standards, guidelines and 
recommendations made by various international organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
International Office of Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention.   
49 See SPS Agreement Article 11.2, which gives the right to dispute settlement panels to consult the relevant 
international organizations on scientific or technical issues. See also SPS Agreement Article 12.3, which requires the 
SPS Committee to “maintain close contact with the relevant international organizations in the field of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection… with the objective of securing the best available scientific and technical advice for the 
administration of this Agreement”.  
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FTA it has signed.50 These FTAs all follow largely the same model on e-commerce, and the 
model is even spilled over to some of the FTAs signed by the US FTA partner with other 
states.51  
 
In general, the obligations in these FTAs can be divided into two categories: first, rules 
converted from existing obligations in the WTO; second, rules beyond the existing WTO 
obligations.  
 
1. Rules based on existing WTO obligations 
 
As e-commerce is a new field, one of the concerns people had was whether the key 
principles of the WTO would continue to apply to the digital frontier.52 This issue is addressed 
in many US FTAs, which states that “[t]he Parties recognize … the applicability of the WTO 
Agreement to measures affecting electronic commerce.”53 While this language sounds reassuring, 
several caveats apply here. First, as the language used here is “recognize”, one may argue that it 
does not create binding obligations for FTA Parties to automatically apply all WTO rules to 
e-commerce. Second, as a matter of fact, it might not be feasible or practical to apply WTO rules 
automatically to measures affecting e-commerce. As mentioned earlier, the WTO has different 
rules for goods and services. Given the controversy in the classification of e-commerce, it is hard 
to apply a set of uniform rules. 
 
To solve this problem, the US FTAs have been taking a pragmatic approach on 
e-commerce. First of all, they try to avoid the classification issue by declining to state explicitly 
                                                          
5050 For a list of the FTAs with e-commerce chapters, see the Annex. Note that e-commerce is addressed in the 
Jordan FTA not as a chapter but a joint-statement.  
51 For an overview of the e-commerce chapters in pre-TPP US FTAs, see Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 
8, 2012, at pp. 192-211. See also Bieron Brian & Ahmed Usman. ‘Regulating E-commerce through International 
Policy: Understanding the International Trade Law Issues of E-commerce’. Journal of World Trade 46, no. 3 (2012): 
545–570, at pp. 548-557. 
52 See Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 8, 2012, at p.182.  
53 See e.g., Article 16.1 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 13.1 of the Bahrain-US FTA; Article 14.1 of the 
CAFTA-US FTA; Article 15.1 of the Colombia-US FTA; Article 15.1 of the Korea-US FTA; Article 14.1 of the 
Morocco-US FTA; Article 14.1 of the Oman-US FTA; Article 14.1 of the Panama-US FTA; Article 15.1 of the 
Peru-US FTA; Article 14.1 of the Singapore-US FTA.   
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whether e-commerce should be treated as goods or services.54 This deliberate ambiguity allows 
them to pick and choose from both GATT and GATS rules to cover any potential loopholes.  
 
For example, if e-commerce activities are classified as goods, they could be subject to 
customs duties. The US FTAs address this issue by affirming the moratorium on customs duties 
established in the WTO Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce. Moreover, these FTAs go 
a step further by filling in the gaps in the WTO rule. For example, Art 16.3 of the Australia-US 
FTA states that “[n]either Party may impose customs duties, fees, or other charges on or in 
connection with the importation or exportation of digital products, regardless of whether they are 
fixed on a carrier medium or transmitted electronically.” This addresses the open questions left by 
the WTO E-commerce Declaration by making it clear that, first, the prohibition applies to other 
fees and charges in addition to customs duties; second, it applies to both imports and exports; and 
third, it applies to the digital product itself regardless of whether it is carried on a traditional 
medium or through electronic transmission. At the same time, recognizing the need for some 
countries to collect customs duties on the carrier medium itself, the FTAs with Singapore and Peru 
also explicitly state that “the customs value of an imported carrier medium bearing a digital 
product” shall be determined “according to the cost or value of the carrier medium alone, without 
regard to the cost or value of the digital product stored on the carrier medium”. This approach has 
the advantage of lowering the tariff burden of the higher-valued digital products or services, thus 
helping to facilitate e-commerce in general.  
 
On the other hand, for those e-commerce activities which could be classified as trade in 
services, the US FTAs also affirms the application of the relevant disciplines to “supply of a 
service delivered or performed electronically” by stating that the obligations contained in the 
relevant FTA chapters (such as those on cross-border trade in services, investment and financial 
services) would be applicable, to the extent that such obligations are not modified by any 
                                                          
54 See e.g., footnote 16-4 of the Australia-US FTA: “The definition of digital products should not be understood to 
reflect a Party’s view on whether trade in digital products through electronic transmission should be categorized as 
trade in services or trade in goods”; footnote 3 of the Chile-US FTA: “The definition of digital products is without 
prejudice to the on-going WTO discussions on whether trade in digital products transmitted electronically is a good 
or a service.”; footnote 4 of the Korea-US FTA: “The definition of digital products should not be understood to 
reflect a Party’s view on whether trade in digital products through electronic transmission should be categorized as 
trade in services or trade in goods.” 
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exceptions or non-conforming measures enumerated in the FTAs.55  
 
After confirming the application of the WTO rules in general, the FTAs go on to 
incorporate several specific principles of the WTO. Of course, these rules have also been 
modified as necessary to fit the unique nature of e-commerce.  
 
The first is the non-discrimination principle. As one of the most fundamental principles 
of the multilateral trading system, the non-discrimination principle plays a key role in the WTO 
legal framework. The principle is reflected in two rules, i.e., the most-favoured-nation rule, 
which prohibits discrimination among imported products; and the national treatment rule, which 
prohibits discrimination against imported products in favour of national products. All of the US 
FTAs incorporate the non-discrimination principle. In many FTAs such as the Singapore and 
Korea FTAs, it is combined with the moratorium on customs duty.56 In the Australia and Chile 
FTAs, it is contained in a separate article.57 
 
Again, the principle has been tweaked here by mixing the approaches taken under the 
GATT and GATS. First, both national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment 
obligations are included. Second, both obligations apply on an unconditional basis. This is more 
in line with the GATT approach and different from the GATS approach, where a Member does 
not assume national treatment obligation for a sector unless specific commitments has been 
scheduled. Third, the FTAs also provide that the two obligations don’t apply to non-conforming 
measures adopted or maintained under the chapters on services and investment, services subsidies, 
or services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.58 This feature is also modelled after 
the GATS, which allows Members to schedule exemptions from MFN as well as national 
treatment obligations. Fourth, the FTAs not only prohibit discrimination on the basis that “the 
                                                          
55 See e.g., Article 16.2 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.2 of the Chile-US FTA; Article 15.2 of the Korea-US 
FTA; Article 14.2 of the Singapore-US FTA.   
56 See Article 15.3 of the Korea-US FTA; Article 14.3 of the Singapore-US FTA.   
57 See Article 16.4 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.4 of the Chile-US FTA.   
58 See Article 16.4.3 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.4.3 of the Chile-US FTA; Article 15.3.4 of the Korea-US 
FTA; Article 14.3.5 of the Singapore-US FTA.     
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digital products receiving less favourable treatment are created, produced, published, stored, 
transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms in the 
territory of the other Party”, but also in cases where “the author, performer, producer, developer, 
distributor, or owner of such digital products is a person of the other Party”.59 In other words, the 
national treatment applies not only to foreign products as in the GATT, but also to foreign 
producers as in the GATS. Moreover, the Australia and Singapore FTAs go a step further than 
even the GATS by extending the national treatment obligation to products or producers who are 
from non-parties.60  
 
The second is the transparency principle, which is contained in both Art X of the GATT 
and Art III of the GATS. The US FTAs with several Latin American and Middle-Eastern 
countries, for example, explicitly provides that the Parties “shall publish or otherwise make 
publicly available its laws, regulations, and other measures of general application that pertain to 
electronic commerce”.61 This provision probably results from the concern by the US in the 
lacking of transparency in the general legal and administrative framework in these countries.  
 
In addition to the application of general principles in the GATT and GATS, the US FTAs 
have also incorporated the principles from the sector-specific agreements and the latest WTO 
Agreements. The example for the former scenario is the provision on access to and use of 
internet for e-commerce, which states that: 
“To support the development and growth of electronic commerce, each Party recognizes 
                                                          
59 See Article 16.4.1 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.4.1 of the Chile-US FTA; Article 15.3.2 of the Korea-US 
FTA; Article 14.3.3 of the Singapore-US FTA.     
60 See Article 16.4.1 of the Australia-US FTA: “Neither Party may accord less favourable treatment to some digital 
products than it accords to other like digital products: (a) on the basis that the digital products receiving less 
favourable treatment are created, produced, published, stored, transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first 
made available on commercial terms outside its territory; (b) on the basis that the author, performer, producer, 
developer, or distributor of such digital products is a person of the other Party or a non-Party”. Article 14.3.3 of the 
Singapore-US FTA: “A Party shall not accord less favorable treatment to some digital products than it accords to 
other like digital products: (a) on the basis that (i) the digital products receiving less favorable treatment are created, 
produced, published, stored, transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms, 
outside its territory; or (ii) the author, performer, producer, developer, or distributor of such digital products is a 
person of the other Party or a non-Party”.  
61 See e.g., Article 14.4 of the CAFTA-US FTA; Article 15.4 of the Colombia-US FTA; Article 14.4 of the 
Panama-US FTA; Article 15.4 of the Peru-US FTA. 
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that consumers in its territory should be able to: 
(a) access and use services and digital products of their choice, unless prohibited by the 
Party’s law; 
(b) run applications and services of their choice, subject to the needs of law Enforcement; 
(c) connect their choice of devices to the Internet, provided that such devices do not harm 
the network and are not prohibited by the Party’s law; and 
(d) have the benefit of competition among network providers, application and service 
providers, and content providers.”62  
 
In a way, this provision is inspired by the existing disciplines under the Annex on 
Telecommunications and Reference Paper, especially the provisions on access to and use of 
public telecommunications transport networks and services63 and competitive safeguards.64 Of 
course, the principles here are also modified to take into account the different nature of 
e-commerce, and the coverage is expanded to include not only the hardware infrastructure of the 
Internet but also the software environment. As the result, the benefit has been extended to not 
only the network providers but also the application providers, service providers and content 
providers.  
 
As to provisions from the latest WTO Agreements, a good example is the provision on 
paperless trading, which can be found in the e-commerce chapters of several US FTAs. This 
article usually includes two sub-sections. One states that the Parties “shall endeavor to accept 
trade administration documents submitted electronically as the legal equivalent of the paper 
version of those documents”.65 This is apparently modelled after Art. 2.1 of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA),66 which states that “[e]ach Member shall, where appropriate, endeavour to 
accept paper or electronic copies of supporting documents required for import, export, or transit 
formalities.” We can see that the US FTA improves upon the TFA provision by first, setting a 
                                                          
62 See Article 15.7 of the Korea-US FTA; 
63 See Section 5 of the Annex on Telecommunications.  
64 Section 1 of the Reference Paper.  
65 See Article 16.7.2 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.6.2 of the Korea-US FTA. 
66 WTO, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WT/L/931, 15 July 2014.  
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preference for electronic submission, and second, recognizing the electronic versions as legally 
equivalent to the paper versions. Under the other sub-section, each Party “shall endeavor to make 
trade administration documents available to the public in electronic form”.67 Again, this can find 
its origin in Art 1.1 of the TFA, which requires WTO Members to review their formalities and 
documentation requirements in light of the technological developments and ensure they are 
“adopted and/or applied in a manner that aims at reducing the time and cost of compliance for 
traders and operators”.  
 
Yet another interesting feature of the US FTAs is the confirmation and application of 
some of the hidden principles under the WTO framework. One such example is the 
technology-neutrality principle, which holds that a service may be applied through any 
means/technology available unless otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule. This principle 
has been recognized by the Council for Trade in Services in its Progress Report to the General 
Council on the work programme on electronic commerce,68 and confirmed by the Panels in the 
US-Gambling 69  and China-Publications and Audiovisual Products 70  cases. However, this 
principle has not been formally incorporated into the WTO agreements. Nonetheless, the US 
FTAs have been applying the principle by explicitly noting the following in the definition 
clauses: 
“carrier medium means any physical object capable of storing a digital product, by any 
method now known or later developed, …… including an optical medium, floppy disk, and 
magnetic tape; 
digital products means the digitally encoded form of computer programs, text, video, 
images, sound recordings, and other products, regardless of whether they are fixed on a carrier 
medium or transmitted electronically;… 
electronic transmission or transmitted electronically means the transfer of digital products 
                                                          
67 See Article 16.7.1 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.6.1 of the Korea-US FTA. 
68 WTO, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Progress Report to the General Council, Adopted by the 
Council for Trade in Services on 19 July 1999, S/L/74, 27 July 1999.  
69 Panel Report in US-Gambling; supra note 31, at paras. 6.280-287.  
70 Panel Report in China- Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 44, at paras. 7.1248-1264.  
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using any electromagnetic or photonic means”.71  
Given the rapid development in the e-commerce sector, it is reassuring to have the 
application of tech-neutrality principle spelled out so clearly and comprehensively.  
 
2. WTO-plus obligations 
 
In addition to incorporating the existing obligations in the WTO agreements, the US 
FTAs have also included provisions on new issues, many of which dealing with non-trade 
concerns. Some of these provisions find their origins from the general exceptions clauses in the 
WTO agreements, while the others are drawn entirely from the non-WTO agreements.   
 
A good example in the first category is clause for online consumer protection, which 
states that “[t]he Parties recognize the importance of maintaining and adopting transparent and 
effective measures to protect consumers from fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices 
when they engage in electronic commerce.”72 This mirrors the language under Art XX(d) of the 
GATT and Art. XIV(c)(i) of the GATS, which allows members to maintain measures necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulation for “prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices”. 
Given the anonymous nature of cyberspace, most e-commerce transactions are conducted without 
physical contacts between the parties. Thus, it is necessary to have in place measures to protect 
consumers from fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices.  
 
Another example is the clause on Cross Border Information Flows, which states that the 
Parties “shall endeavor to refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessary barriers to electronic 
information flows across borders”.73 One may argue that the clause is encompassed by the 
prohibition of “disguised restriction on international trade” under the GATT and GATS 
exceptions clauses, but again it comes with a different twist here. First of all, the language 
“electronic information flows across borders” is broad enough to cover even non-trade related 
information flows. Second, as the clause only applies to “cross-border” barriers, one may argue 
                                                          
71 See Article 16.8 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.9 of the Korea-US FTA; Article 14.4 of the Singapore-US 
FTA. 
72 See Article 16.6 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.5 of the Korea-US FTA. 
73 See Article 15.8 of the Korea-US FTA. 
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that domestic restrictions on data flows could be allowed. However, given the wide-spread use of 
offshore servers and the borderless nature of the cyberspace, even domestic regulations could 
potentially have cross-border implications. Third, the clause also leaves some flexibility to 
regulators by implicitly allowing “necessary” barriers to cross-border, but the question of whether 
the necessity requirement is a subjective or objective one is left open. In any event, as this 
provision is couched in best-endeavour language, it might not have major implications for the FTA 
Parties.  
 
On the other hand, the provisions on electronic authentication and electronic signatures 
are entirely new in the world of trade agreements. These provisions require the FTA Parties to 
leave it to the parties to an electronic transaction to mutually determine the appropriate 
authentication methods for the transaction, or at least be given the opportunity to prove in court 
that their electronic transaction complies with any legal requirements with respect to 
authentication.74 They solve a big problem in e-commerce, which due to its very nature often 
have difficulty meeting the requirements under traditional contract laws. As these issues deal 
mainly with the contracts between private parties, the WTO has never ventured into these areas. 
Instead, the FTAs draw their inspiration from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce75 (1996) and Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001)76. Given the widespread 
adoption of the two Model Laws by the major economies in the world,77 the US FTAs set good 
examples by including a clause on electronic authentication and electronic signatures. In the long 
run, these clauses could help pave the way for the harmonization of international rules on these 
issues.   
 
III. Regulation of Digital Trade in the TPP 
 
Compared to the previous US FTAs, the TPP has even more advanced rules on digital 
                                                          
74 See Article 16.5 of the Australia-US FTA; Article 15.4 of the Korea-US FTA. 
75 See Articles 5-8, 11. 
76 See Articles 3 & 6. 
77 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce has been adopted by 66 States including the US while the Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures has been adopted by 32 states. See their respective statuses at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html and 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2001Model_status.html.  
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trade, which are touted by the USTR as “the most ambitious trade policy ever designed for the 
internet and electronic commerce”.78 
 
In September 2008, the USTR first announced the launch of US negotiations to join the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
concluded by Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.79 With the US on board, 
several other countries also queued up for the agreement, which quickly snowballed from one of 
the smallest FTAs into the biggest trade deal the world has ever seen.80  
 
After seven years of negotiations, in October 2015, the trade ministers of the twelve 
countries finally announced the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the new agreement, 
which has been renamed as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”). 81 
Notwithstanding the surprise withdrawal from the Agreement by President Trump on Jan 24, 
2017, the TPP still provides important insights into the future directions of the US trade policy. 
This is the case not only for traditional trade issues such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also 
for cutting-egg issues which would make the TPP a truly “21st century” trade agreement.  
 
Since the beginning of the negotiations, the TPP has been touted as a “high-standard”, 
“21st Century” trade agreement. As such, it is no surprise that e-commerce features prominently in 
its agenda. In the Nov 2011 Outline for the TPP, the TPP Members agreed that the e-commerce 
text shall “enhance the viability of the digital economy”.82 To achieve this goal, the Members 
resolved to ensure that “impediments to both consumer and businesses embracing this medium of 
                                                          
78 USTR, TPP Chapter Summary: Electronic Commerce, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Electronic-Commerce.pdf.  
79 USTR, United States to Negotiate Participation in Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, Sept 2008, 
available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/World_Regions/Southeast_Asia_Pacific/Trans-Pacific_Partnership_Agreement/Fact_
Sheets/asset_upload_file602_15133.pdf.  
80 In addition to the US and the original 4 countries, the new members of the TPP are Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam. 
81 Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement, Oct 2015, available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/trans-pacific-partnership-ministers. 
82 TPP Members, Outlines of TPP, Honolulu, Hawaii on November 12, 2011, available at 
https://ustr.gov/tpp/outlines-of-TPP.  
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trade are addressed”.83 
 
In June 2014, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) further elaborated the U.S. 
objectives in the TPP, including the following on e-Commerce and telecom: 
“- commitments not to impose customs duties on digital products (e.g., software, music, 
video, e-books); 
- non-discriminatory treatment of digital products transmitted electronically and 
guarantees that these products will not face government-sanctioned discrimination based on the 
nationality or territory in which the product is produced; 
- requirements that support a single, global Internet, including ensuring cross-border data 
flows, consistent with governments’ legitimate interest in regulating for purposes of privacy 
protection; 
- rules against localization requirements that force businesses to place computer 
infrastructure in each market in which they seek to operate;  
- commitments to provide reasonable network access for telecommunications suppliers 
through interconnection and access to physical facilities; 
- provisions promoting choice of technology and competitive alternatives to address the 
high cost of international mobile roaming”.84  
 
In the final Agreement, the TPP devoted an entire chapter to e-commerce. In contrast, 
many contemporary FTAs concluded by other WTO Members, especially developing countries, 
either fail to address e-commerce issues at all or simply mention the issue in one or two articles. 
One may argue that such an approach simply follows the established practice of the US, which 
has included e-commerce chapters in every FTA it has concluded in the new century. However, 
if we take a closer look, we can see that the e-commerce chapter in the TPP exceeds the 
preceding FTAs in both breadth and depth. For example, the most comprehensive e-commerce 
chapter before the TPP was contained in the US-Korea FTA. It includes 9 articles and covers the 
following issues: electronic supply of services, digital products (which include moratorium on 
                                                          
83 Id.  
84 United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, available at 
https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives.  
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customs duties and non-discriminatory treatments), electronic authentication and electronic 
signatures, online consumer protection, paperless trading, access to and use of internet for 
e-commerce, and cross-border information flows. In contrast, the TPP includes a total of 18 
articles and address additional issues such as domestic electronic transactions framework, 
personal information protection, Internet interconnection charge sharing, location of computing 
facilities, unsolicited commercial electronic messages, cooperation, source code and dispute 
settlement. In summary, while the TPP e-commerce text includes the key elements of the 
traditional US template, it also includes new features which reflect new directions in the US 
policy. On the other hand, as the TPP is a regional initiative that involve more parties than the 
traditional bilateral US FTAs, the US also have to make compromises in the TPP in response to 
the bargaining pressures from the other parties. As the result, while the TPP e-commerce chapter 
was able to make progress on some new issues, it has retracted from the earlier US FTAs on 
some other issues.  
 
1. New Progresses Made 
 
While many of the issues addressed in the TPP are new to the multilateral trading system, 
the regulatory approach still largely follows the traditional WTO model by focusing on the 
regulators. 
 
Many of these are couched in the “thou shalt not” language familiar to trade lawyers. For 
example, under Art. 14.13, TPP Members shall not require a covered person to use or locate 
computing facilities such as servers and storage facilities in the host country’s territory as a 
condition for conducting business in that territory. In a way, this provision resembles the 
prohibition of local content requirements found under the TRIMs agreement.85  
 
Similarly, under Art. 14.17, a TPP Member may not require the transfer of, or access to, 
source code of software owned by a person of another Party, as a condition for the import, 
distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products containing such software, in its territory. 
But the prohibition applies only to mass-market software or products containing such software, 
                                                          
85 Article 1, Annex: Illustrative List, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.  
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which implies that softwares tailor-made for specific clients/projects are excluded. The same 
article further excludes software used for critical infrastructure and those in commercially 
negotiated contracts, and allows Parties to require the modification of source code to ensure 
compliance with its FTA-consistent laws or regulations, and the provision of source code for 
patent applications.  
 
Some other articles take a step further by requiring the TPP parties to make positive 
efforts and put in place certain laws and regulations. For example, in addition to the provision on 
the recognition of validity of electronic authentication methods and electronic signatures, TPP 
Members are also required to maintain a legal framework governing electronic transactions 
consistent with the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) or 
the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (2005).86 Another two articles require the Parties to adopt or maintain the necessary 
legal framework for online consumer protection and personal information protection 
respectively.87  
 
In contrast, with respect to some of the other issues, the TPP takes an entirely new 
approach by shifting the regulatory focus to business firms. The most obvious example is the 
provision on unsolicited commercial electronic messages, which requires the suppliers of such 
information to either obtain the consent from the recipient, or at least allow the recipient to 
choose not to receive such information.88 If the suppliers fail to comply, the recipient shall have 
recourse again them. 89  Similarly, the burden of meeting the requirements for personal 
information protection also rests largely with private firms. Indeed, the TPP explicitly allows the 
Members to meet the obligation for personal information protection by not having mandatory 
laws on the substantive obligations, but just relying on the enforcement of voluntary 
undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy.90  
                                                          
86 TPP Article 14.5. 
87 TPP Articles 14.7 & 14.8. 
88 TPP Article 14.14.1.  
89 TPP Article 14.14.2.  
90 Footnote 6 to TPP Article 14.8: “For greater certainty, a Party may comply with the obligation in this paragraph 
by adopting or maintaining measures such as a comprehensive privacy, personal information or personal data 
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Another two new provisions under the TPP deal with cyber-security cooperation91 and 
internet connection charge sharing92. However, as they use best-endeavour languages, they might 
have only limited impacts. 
 
2. Where the TPP is Falling Short 
 
First, the overall scope of the TPP is narrower. The narrower scope is mainly defined by 
limiting the type of actors that conduct the activity or hold or process the information. For 
example, under Art. 14.2, the TPP has explicitly carved out government procurement and 
information held or processed by or on behalf of a Party, or measures related to such information, 
including measures related to its collection. With this carve-out, the TPP countries could require 
that government data be stored and processed only on domestic computing facilities, or require 
suppliers in government procurement projects to transfer the source code to the government. One 
might think that this carve-out mainly respond to concerns from the lesser developed TPP 
countries, but as the Edward Snowden Affair has illustrated, even a most advanced and open 
economy like the US might share the reluctance to subject its government to the highly 
demanding requirements under the TPP. Similarly, Art. 14.1 excludes “financial institution” and 
“cross-border financial service supplier of a Party” from the scope of “covered person” under the 
e-commerce chapter. This probably reflects the consensus among the TPP Members to strengthen 
the regulation of financial sector in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis.  
 
Second, the scope of the non-discrimination obligation has shrunk as well. To start with, 
all previous FTAs covers digital products which “are created, produced, published, stored, 
transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms” in 
another FTA party. The TPP, however, removes “stored” from the list and denies 
non-discrimination to non-TPP originating digital products that are stored on servers in TPP 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
protection laws, sector-specific laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of voluntary 
undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy.”  
91 TPP Article 14.16. 
92 TPP Article 14.12. 
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countries.93 Similarly, by removing the category “distributor” from the previous FTA list of “the 
author, performer, producer, developer, or distributor of such digital products is a person of the 
other Party”, the TPP essentially allows Members to deny non-discriminatory treatment to popular 
app distributors such as Google Play store and Apple App store, both of which sell many apps 
developed by non-TPP nationals. Also, while some earlier FTAs such as the ones with Australia 
and Singapore extend the non-discrimination benefits to digital products from non-FTA parties, 
the most recent Korea FTA has retracted by reserving the benefits only to FTA parties.94 This 
less-liberal approach is followed by the TPP. 95  To sum up, under the TPP, the benefit of 
non-discrimination seems to be reserved only for those with direct roles to play in shaping the 
content of the products, rather than just provide storage or distribution services for the product.  
 
Third, with regard to the provision on cross-border information flow, while the TPP has 
strengthened the obligation by changing the language from the best endeavor language in the 
KORUS FTA to a legally binding “shall”, it has also taken a backward step by limiting the scope 
from all information to only such information transfer that is “for the conduct of the business of a 
covered person”.96 This limitation is reportedly added to address concerns by countries like 
Australia and New Zealand,97 but it could raise several problems. First, as the definition of 
covered person only includes covered investment, investor or service supplier, other parties 
cannot benefit from this provision. In other words, if a Member choose not to open up a sector 
for services trade or investment from other TPP Parties, it can restrict information flow in the 
sector. Second, even for covered persons, they can only claim the benefit for those activities “for 
the conduct of the business”. If interpreted narrowly, one can argue that even pre-sale promotional 
activities might not be covered here. Third, as the word used here is “for the conduct of the 
business”, it could be argued that only for-profit activities count as “business” activities and 
not-for-profit activities such as free search engine service, free social media and free news service 
                                                          
93 Compare TPP Article 14.4 with Australia-US FTA Article 16.4.1 & Singapore-US FTA Article 14.3.3. 
94 Compare Korea-US FTA Article 15.3.2 with Article 14.4 with Australia-US FTA Article 16.4.1 & Singapore-US 
FTA 14.3.3. 
95 TPP Article 14.4.1.  
96 TPP Article 14.11.2. 
97 TPP Countries to discuss Australian Alternative to Date-flow Proposal, Inside US Trade, Jul 6, 2012. 
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etc. are not covered as they do not qualify as proper “business”. Thus, the blocking of Google, 
Facebook and open-access newspapers by certain countries might be perfectly legal under this 
provision.  
 
IV. Concluding Thoughts 
 
As we can see from our earlier discussions, while the TPP is not the first US FTA to 
include an e-commerce chapter, it has many interesting features, and they reflect major shifts in 
both regulatory philosophy and regulatory approach in the new era of US FTAs.  
 
First, in terms of the overall regulatory philosophy, the earlier US FTAs tend to focus 
mostly on the “trade” aspects by trying to fit digital trade into the existing framework of the WTO 
and borrowing heavily from the WTO rulebooks, while the TPP has started to recognize the unique 
nature of e-commerce and tried to formulate new rules befitting the “digital” nature of digital trade. 
Such efforts are most evident in rules relating to issues such as transfer of source code and forced 
localization requirements, which are new issues created by the amorphous and borderless nature of 
digital trade.  
 
Of course, it would be unfair to say that the earlier FTAs have made no headway into the 
“digital” regulation aspects. For example, by explicitly stating that digital products encompass 
both goods and services, the earlier US FTAs avoid the trap set by the compartmentalization 
between the GATT and the GATS and made a small but important step into the formulation of a 
coherent approach on digital trade.  
 
Nonetheless, due to their inherent myopia on the nature of digital trade, the earlier US 
FTAs just blindly followed the regulatory approach under the WTO by focusing on the 
regulation of national governments, even though, ironically, one might argue that digital trade 
was able to develop so quickly largely because there was little or no governmental regulation. 
Perhaps in recognition of this, the TPP has taken a different approach by shifting the regulatory 
burden to private firms, as they are the really the ones who have created the digital frontier. With 
the massive information they have in control, private firms such as Google and Facebook are 
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much more powerful than most governments and the TPP has done the right thing by including 
them in the regulatory matrix.  
 
Notwithstanding the withdrawal from the TPP by President Tump, the TPP still reflects 
the priorities and approaches taken in US trade negotiations for future FTAs, as well as other 
negotiating fora. For example, those who are familiar with the negotiations under the Trade in 
Services Agreement (“TiSA”) can find many similarities between the TPP provisions and the US 
proposals on e-commerce in the TiSA.98 At the same time, given the large and diverse 
membership of the TPP, the US did not always get what it wanted but occasionally had to settle 
with compromises in the TPP. Therefore, even with the recent US withdrawal from the TPP, the 
digital trade rules in the TPP can still tell us a lot about the future direction of US policy in this 
area. It will tell us not only what the US wants, but also what the US is likely to get in a 
plurilateral or even multilateral deal under the bargaining pressures from the other parties. Thus, 
understanding the evolution of digital trade rules from earlier US FTAs to the TPP is important 
not only for the remaining TPP Members, but also for the other countries, as they will very likely 
have to face similar rules under the TiSA or even the WTO one day.    
 
  
                                                          
98 For an analysis of the US positions under the TiSA, see Burcu Kilic & Tamir Israel, Analysis: Leaked TISA 
Annex on Electronic Commerce, available at 
https://wikileaks.org/tisa/analysis/Analysis-of-201505_Annex-on-Electronic-Commerce/.  
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Annex: List of pre-TPP US FTAs with E-commerce Chapters 
 
 Australia: Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (2004) 
 Chile: Chile–United States Free Trade Agreement (2004) 
 Singapore: Singapore–United States Free Trade Agreement (2004) 
 Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (2005) 
 Bahrain: Bahrain–United States Free Trade Agreement (2006) 
 Morocco: Morocco-United States Free Trade Agreement (2006) 
 Oman: Oman–United States Free Trade Agreement (2006) 
 Peru: Peru–United States Trade Promotion Agreement (2007) 
 Panama: Panama–United States Trade Promotion Agreement (2012) 
 Colombia: United States–Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2012) 
 South Korea: United States–Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012) 
